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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK RIGGLE and GENEVA H.
RIGGLE, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.DAINES I\IANUF ACTURING
CO:MP ANY, INC., a corporation,

Case No.
10948

Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FO·R REHEARING
NATURE OF THE CASE
The purpose of this case is to determine whether or
not the Defendant-Appellant is liable for the balance
due on its promissory note in favor of the PlaintiffsRespondents.
DISPOSITION BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
rrhe Utah Supreme Court, by decision filed March
20, 1968, reversed and remanded for further proceedings
the Summary Judgment granted March 28, 1967, by Salt
1

Lake County District Court in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Respondents for the amount due on the promissory note
including interest, attorney's fees, and Court costs. '
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiffs-Respondents seek to have the Court re- '
consider its decision and conform the same to the
admitted facts and law applicable to this ca.se.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the brief of the
Plaintiffs-Respondents on file with this Court is incorporated herein by this reference.
Certain essential and salient facts are misstated in
the Court's opinion and other facts that were admitted
have not been given consideration in such opinion. Further facts have been assumed which are not supported
by the record. Therefore, certain of the facts in the
instant case are restated and reviewed.
1. The partnership consisted of four members and
was organized in early 1954 (R-36).

2. The Corporation was organized in early 1955 and
had in excess of ten incorporators (Respondents' Brief-

3).
3. The employment contract that gave rise to the
note was executed over five months after the incorporation of the Defendant (R-13) .

."",

4. The Corporation did not assume the $10,000.00
obligation of the partnership. (Please take judicial
notice of Case No. 155799, Salt Lake District Court Salt
'
Lake County, wherein the Plaintiff herein has sued the
partnership, and each member, for the unpaid $10,000.00
note. rrhe Corporation is not a party Defendant, nor has
it been intcrplead by the Defendant partners).
Please noie that there are no agreements, deeds,
rhoses of action, or otherwise between the Plaintiff,
Riggle, and the Defendant Corporation other than the
promissory note here sued on and subject of this action.
ARGUMENT
In order to properly address an argument to this
case, it is ne-cessary to analyze some of the confusing
statements in the Court's opinion. The Court stated that
the Defendant had claimed that Mr. Riggle lacked qualifications to render service. The employment agreement
is in the record (R-13). The agreement, which is signed
by the Corporation's president, and admitted genuine by
the pleadings, states that Mr. Riggle had several years
of experience in business management and metal engineering. The statement, which is signed by the Corporation, has not been contested by the Corporation. Further,
in the a.ffidavit of Darrel R. Daines, President of the
Corporation, he states that, ''The Plaintiff Frank Riggle
was to furnish business and engineering consultation as
a way of justifying his employment" (R-19).
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Please note that the employment contract required
Mr. Riggle to be available on demand and that there iR
no claim that he ever refused to render service.
The entire argument in relation to whether or not
.Mr. Riggle rendered services is moot, irrelevant, anti
immaterial, for the Corpora tion's contract with Mr.
Riggle was merged into a promissory note, the contract
terminated, and the note represents the total obligation
between the parties.
1

In the opinion the Court states, '' ... the members
of the partnership organized the defendant corporation ... '' This statement contains only half truths, for
the Defendants were merely some of the parties who
organized the Corporation that had more than ten incorporators. A completely new legal entity was crnated and
the ownership thereof was entirely changed (Respondents' Brief-3).
1

The Court further states, ''After its incorporation
the defendant assumed the obligations of the partnership, including the note and the employment contract."
This stafoment is entirely unsupported by the record.
It is also untrue. The Corporation did not at any time
assume the $10,000.00 note. The only statement that is
even slightly evidentiary in this matter would he the
statement of Mr. Daines in his Affidavit to the extent
that, "It was agreed that both the note and employment
contract would become obligations of the Corporation
when the Corporation organization was completed" (R19). This statement was made in relation to the trans4

1

action that took effect before the Corporation was organized and is not even evidence of what the Corporation
did after it was organized.

In speculation, it is difficult to imagine what type
of valid consideration would support the Corporation's
assumption of a $10,000.00 debt in a situation where the
Corporation did not receive any benefit from the assumption. Please note that the entire $10,000.00 had been
ginn to the partnership many months before the Corporation was organized.
'l'he Court, in its second paragraph, indicates that
the defendant corporation claimed that the employment
contract was an inducement to make the loan to the
partnership and a device to avoid the usury law. It is
absolutely, factually, legally, and logically impossible to
ort ~· these statements ! How, by any stretch of the
imagination, could an employment contract between a
corporntion and the Plaintiff that arose 11 months and
22 days after the loan of $10,000.00 to a partnership, be
an inducement to loan the money ·to the partnership. It
may be presumptuous to ref er the Supreme Court to a
dictionary for a definition of the word inducement, so
\\'e merely refer the Court to the word and call its attention to the effect that an inducement must antidate, not
postdate, the thing it induces.
Mr. Riggle had no economic leverage on the Corporation prior to the time the Corporation executed an
employment contract with him. Even if the Corporation
had assumed prior debts or employment agreements, this
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would be a unilateral assumption and not enforceable by
Riggle without new consideration passing from the Cor.
poration to him and no such consideration is alleged or
implied in the record.
The Corporation entered into an employment con.
tract requiring the Plaintiff to render services at their
demand. The employment contract was terminated and
the promissory note issued in substitution therefor.
Even though it is not necessary that the original
obligation which is discharged by the novation be valid,
(Williston on Contracts, Volume 6, Section 1872, pages
52-58), in the case before the Court the original obligation was valid in every sense of the word, for the Corporation voluntarily executed the employment agreement
with Mr. Riggle under circumstances where there could
not have been any legal or financial reason motivating
the Corporation to execute the employment agreement.
The Court stated that one of the issues would be
lack of consideration for the note. Since a peppercorn
is adequate consideration, certainly the cancellation of a
contraet requiring monthly payment and forgiveness of
an accruing obligation containing additional years of
performance is legal consideration.

If the Plaintiff's services under the contract were
not adequate or performed in accordance with the terms
of the contract, these would have been matters that would
have given the Corporation the right to terminate the
contract for cause. We do not know why the Corpora·
6

tion terminated the contract, but we do know it was terminated and that the Corporation then acknowledged a
past-due indebtedness and confirmed such indebtedness
with a promissory note. There is no quesHon of fact as
to the consideration for the note.
'l'he Supreme Court states that a question of fact is
the legality of the obligation. I am certain this Court is
familiar with the laws relating to negotiable instruments
and promissory notes. Defendants have admitted the
genuineness of the promissory note. If the note is genuine, how is it possible for the note to be illegal. There
is no allegation that it \vas issued in violation of any
statute 01· any la:w. To the contrary, the facts show that
even assuming the Defendant's claim of usury in connection with the $10,000.00 promissory note issued by a
partnership at a time prior to the existence of the Corporation was true, nevertheless this transaction did not
possibly, legally, logically, morally, or in any other way
taint a transaction occurring after the date of the supposed usurious transaction and between different parties
and for different purposes. It is simply not logically
possible for this agreement between the Plaintiff and a
corporation which was not even existing at the time a
usurious contract was claimed to have been executed to
have been an inducement to or usury for the loan which
had been completed over a year before the contract came
into being.
\Ve should like to further point out that whether or
not services were renden~d under the contract is now
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both immaterial and irrelevant to this cause for the following reasons :

1. The contrac.t required performance only at the
request of the Corporation.
2. It is not alleged that Plaintiff ever refused a
request of the Corporation.
3. The contract was terminated and m lieu of the
contract a promissory note was executed which is the
subjcet of the action before this Court.
CONCLUSION
In couelusion your Petitioner would like to again
indic.ate the simplicity of this action and the issues
before the Court. Since this Corporation was not even
an existing thing at the time the usurious transaction
was claimed to have occurred, it could not have been a
party nor can it claim to be even connected to the allegetl
usurious transaction. Is there never an end to controversy~ Should not this Court support settlement to giYe
some finality to transactions between citizens?
, Respec nlly suhmit~ted
.
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